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We study the e¤ects of progressive labor income taxation in an
otherwise standard NK model. We show that progressive taxation
(i) introduces a trade-o¤ between output and in‡ation stabilization
and a¤ects the slope of the Phillips Curve; (ii) acts as automatic
stabilizer changing the responses to technology shocks and demand
shocks (iii) alters the prescription for the optimal monetary policy.
The welfare gains from commitment decrease as labor income taxes
become more progressive. Quantitatively, the model reproduces the
observed negative correlation between the volatility of output, hours
and in‡ation and the degree of progressivity of labor income taxation.
JEL CODES: E50, E52, E58
1 Introduction
In its attempt to provide an increasingly realistic interpretation of the dy-
namics of actual economies, the New Keynesian literature has not paid much
attention to the structure of taxation and, more in general, to the role of
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1automatic stabilizers.1 This is hardly surprising, given the emphasis of this
literature on monetary policy but, as we argue in this paper, the absence of
an adequate description of the working of modern tax systems may lead to
misleading results and so reduce the empirical performance of the model.
There is evidence, however, that automatic stabilizers, and in particular
progressive taxation, signi…cantly a¤ect the response of important time series
to the relevant shocks. Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), for example, …nd
empirical evidence that progressive income taxation may help stabilize output
both via its e¤ect on the labor supply and via its traditional e¤ect on the
aggregate demand.2 In a recent paper on the 2007 crisis Dolls et al. (2010)
show that automatic stabilizers absorb 38 per cent of a proportional income
shock in the EU - with a much larger impact in Northern European countries
than in Southern and Eastern European - and 32 per cent in the US. The
negative correlation between output volatility and the size of the government
sector - a well known stylized fact documented, among others, by Galì (1994)
and Fatás and Mihov (2001) - is usually explained with the existence of
automatic stabilizers.
In this paper, we concentrate on progressive labor income taxation and
we study the macroeconomic consequences of this important automatic sta-
bilizer. As we can see from table 1, almost all governments tax labor in-
come progressively although the degree of progressivity shows huge variabil-
ity across countries. If we restrict the attention to OECD countries, we go
from countries like the Czech Republic where wages are subject to an approx-
imately 20% tax rate independently of the tax base, to countries like Sweden,
where labor income tax rates are 23.4% for workers earning 67% of the aver-
age wage, more than double for workers that earn 137% of the average wage
and reach 56.4% for workers earning 167% of the average wage. Shouldn’t
we expect signi…cant di¤erences in the dynamics of the Czech and Swedish
economies? Shouldn’t monetary policy respond di¤erently in a country like
Sweden where wage increases above average are so penalized by the tax sys-
tem than in countries like the Czech Republic where labor income taxes are
basically ‡at?
These questions resemble those concerning the macroeconomic conse-
quences of wage rigidity. While the rigidity of wages however, cannot be
1To the best of our knowledge, while there is a signi…cant number of studies on dis-
tortionary …scal rules (usually …nanced by lump sum taxation) such as Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2007 and 2010) and Benigno and Woodford (2006), the only NK models that
explicitly treat the issue of automatic stabilizers are Andrés and Domenech (2006) and
Andrés et al. (2008).
2Similarly, Auerbach (2002) …nds that automatic stabilizers embedded in the US …scal
system have contributed to cushioning cyclical ‡uctuations.
2taken as given, but must be derived as an equilibrium outcome, the degree
of progressivity can be regarded as a structural characteristic of an economy.
The aim of progressive taxation is to achieve a more egalitarian distribution
of income and therefore is crucially linked to the preferences of society or to
the social contract. In analyzing short run stabilization policy, therefore, it
can be safely taken as parametric.
In order to introduce progressive taxation in an otherwise standard New
Keynesian model, we follow the approach of Guo (1999) and Guo and Lans-
ing (1998) that analyze this issue in a Real Business Cycle framework and
suggest a convenient and tractable way to model progressive taxation in rep-
resentative agents economies.
The consequences of progressive taxation for the New Keynesian model
are quite relevant. First, we …nd that in economies characterized by progres-
sive labor income taxation, policy makers face a trade-o¤ between in‡ation
stabilization and output stabilization. This is quite interesting since it is
well known that the New Keynesian model, in its standard version, does not
imply any policy trade-o¤s3, while these trade-o¤s are usually perceived by
central banks as a major challenge in formulating monetary policy.
Second, not only we …nd that in a model with progressive taxation the
New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) is signi…cantly a¤ected by productiv-
ity and government spending shocks, but we also …nd that the response of
in‡ation to movements in the output gap increases as the labor income tax be-
comes more progressive, i.e., the Phillips curve becomes steeper. Economies
characterized by a more progressive tax structure, therefore, will typically
face a larger trade-o¤ between in‡ation stabilization and output stabiliza-
tion. The reason is quite intuitive. Following a productivity shock, output
increases, the labor demand schedule shift outwards and real wages must
increase. When taxes are progressive, as the real wage increases labor in-
come taxes increase more than proportionally. The supply of labor therefore
increases less than in the basic NK model. In order to produce the same
amount of output, …rms must o¤er an higher real wage at the cost of setting
3See for example Galì (2008) ch. 4. In the literature this problem has been dealt with
by amending, in some ad hoc way, the NK model. In their "Science of Monetary Policy"
Clarida Galì and Gertler (1999) amended the standard NK Phillips curve by adding an
exogenous cost-push shock. In a further paper, Clarida Galì and Gertler (2002) proposed
a NK model with variable markups.Woodford (2003) discusses a source of monetary policy
trade-o¤s di¤erent from cost-push shocks created by the presence of transactions friction.
More recently, Blanchard and Galì (2007) have shown that economies characterized by
real wage rigidities experience a policy trade-o¤. While these authors simply assume that
the current real wage is a function of the past real wage. Mattesini and Rossi (2009) show
that a signi…cant policy trade-o¤ arises also in a two sector economy were one of the two
sectors is unionized.
3higher prices and therefore higher in‡ation.
Third, by approximating the model up to a …rst order, we …nd that a
progressive labor income tax has non-linear dynamic e¤ects and changes the
response of the economy to technology, government spending and monetary
policy shocks. In particular, progressive labor income taxation acts as an
automatic stabilizer: the higher is the degree of progressivity, the lower is
the volatility of output and in‡ation in response to the relevant shocks that
hit the economy.
Fourth, studying the dynamic properties of a simple interest rate rule,
we …nd that progressive taxation shrinks the determinacy region: the more
progressive is the labor income tax, the smaller is the number of Taylor rules
that are able to guarantee a unique rational expectations equilibrium.
Finally, we study optimal monetary policy, both under discretion and
under commitment. We follow Benigno and Woodford (2005) who derive
a linear-quadratic (LQ) approximation of the households’ utility function
around a distorted steady state. We …nd that progressive labor income tax-
ation alters the prescriptions for optimal discretionary monetary policy: a
central bank that operates in an economy characterized by a more progres-
sive tax structure should pursue more aggressive monetary policies than a
central bank operating in an economy with ‡atter labor income taxes to push
output toward its e¢cient level. We then study the welfare gains from com-
mitment and we …nd that they get smaller as labor income taxes become
more progressive.
Interestingly, our model not only provides a theoretical framework to
study the working of automatic stabilizers, but is also consistent some cru-
cial relationships that are found in the data, such as the negative correlation
between output, labor hours and in‡ation volatility and the degree of pro-
gressivity of the tax system.
Theoretical papers that introduce progressive taxation in the New Key-
nesian model are relatively few.4 Heer and Maussner (2006) compare the
response of the OLG model to technology and monetary shocks with the
corresponding representative-agent model. Vanhala (2006) considers a NK
model with matching frictions in the labour market and shows that the ef-
fects of an increase in tax progression on macroeconomic volatility cannot be
clearly de…ned and depend on whether taxation is initially progressive or ini-
4In a paper that is, in some way, related to ours Edge and Rudd (2009) study the
e¤ects of nominal taxes on the economy REE equilibrium. They study the e¤ects of a tax
on the nominal interest rate, the e¤ect of bracket creep and that of nominal depreciation
allowances and show how these tax schemes a¤ect determinacy. Our model focuses on
di¤erent issues. In particular, we do not consider …scal drag e¤ects; the marginal income
tax increases only when the real wage bill gets higher than its steady state value.
4tially proportional. Kleven and Kreiner (2003) analyze the e¤ects of taxation
in a menu cost model as in Blanchard Kyotaki (1987) and Ball and Romer
(1991) and show that taxes act as automatic destabilizers. Di¤erently from
these papers and consistently with the empirical evidence we propose in our
empirical exercise, we …nd instead a clear stabilizing e¤ects of progressive
taxation. Furthermore, none of these papers, analyze the consequences of
progressive taxation for the in‡ation-output stabilization trade-o¤ or opti-
mal monetary policy.
The only paper that, to our knowledge, analyzes the welfare consequences
of monetary policy with progressive taxation is Collard and Dellas (2005).
These authors ask whether and to what extent the existence of variable tax
distortions support deviations from perfect price stability and …nd that op-
timal monetary policy involves some tolerance of price instability, although
optimal departures from perfect price stability are practically small. With
respect to this paper, that evaluates numerically the model dynamics, we can
characterize analytically the di¤erence between the e¢cient and the ‡exible
price allocation. This allows us to show analytically how progressive taxation
introduces an in‡ation-output trade-o¤ as well as to provide analytical solu-
tions for the model dynamics and the optimal monetary policy under both a
discretionary and a commitment regime. Moreover, while Collard and Dellas
(2005) evaluate welfare around an e¢cient steady state, we study optimal
policy in economies that evolve around a distorted steady state as suggested
by Benigno and Woodford (2005).5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the
model. Section 3 studies the model dynamics. Section 4 provides a quan-
titative evaluation of our model. Section 5 derives analytically the Central
Bank welfare function as a linear quadratic approximation of the households’
utility function and study the optimal discretionary monetary policy and the
welfare gains from commitment as the degree of the progressivity of the labor
income taxation varies. Section 6 concludes.
5Doing so we depart from the widespread practice in the NK literature to evaluate
welfare by considering models in which the deterministic steady state is e¢cient. This
last approach introduces a battery of subsidies to production and employment aimed at
eliminating the long-run distortions. This is usually done for purely computational reasons.
However, as argued by many, this practice has two main shortcomings: (i) the policy
instruments necessary to remove the steady state distortions are empirically implausible;
(ii) a policy that is optimal for an economy with an e¢cient steady state will not necessary
be so for an economy with a distorted steady state.
52 The model
2.1 Consumer Optimization
We consider an economy populated by many identical, in…nitely lived worker-
households, each of measure zero. Households demand a Dixit Stiglitz com-
posite consumption bundle Ct produced by a continuum of monopolistically
competitive …rms. The life-time expected utility function of the representa-

















￿;￿ > 0 (1)
where 0 < ￿ < 1 is the subjective discount rate, and Nt 2 (0;1) is the
supply of labor hours. Aggregate consumption Ct is de…ned as a Dixit-Stiglitz
consumption basket. Labor income is taxed at the rate ￿t: The individual
‡ow budget constraint is:
PtCt + R
￿1
t Bt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)WtNt + Bt￿1 + ￿t(j) ￿ PtT
l
t (2)
where Pt is the price level, Bt is the stock of risk-free nominal bonds purchased
at the beginning of period t and maturing at the end of the period. Rt is
the gross nominal interest rate. Wt is the nominal wage and ￿t is the pro…t
income. Households pay a lump sum tax T l
t and taxes on labor income ￿t.
Following Guo (1999) and Guo and Lansing (1998) we postulate that ￿t takes
the form:





; ￿ 2 (0;1]; ￿n 2 [0;1) (3)
where Yn = WN=P represents a base level of income, taken as given by the
household. We set this level to the steady state level of per capita income.
When the actual income of the household Yn;t = WtNt=Pt is above Yn then the
tax rate is higher than when the taxable income is below Yn: The parameters
￿ and ￿n govern the level and the slope of the tax schedule, respectively.
When ￿n > 0 the tax rate increases in the household’s taxable income.
We impose restrictions on these parameters to ensure that 0 ￿ ￿t < 1, and
households have an incentive to supply labor to …rms.
In order to understand the progressivity of the taxation scheme it is useful
to distinguish between the average tax rate which is given by (3), and the












6Here we consider an environment where ￿t is strictly less than 100% and
where also ￿m
t is strictly less than 100% so that households have an incentive
to supply labor to …rms. Since ￿m





the marginal tax rate
is above the average tax rate when ￿n > 0. In this case the tax schedule is
said to be “progressive”. When ￿n = 0, the average and marginal tax rates
of labor income are both equal to 1 ￿ ￿, and the labor tax schedule is said
to be “‡at”.6
Households maximize (1) subject to (2). Therefore, the optimal labor



















Equation (5) states that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption equals the real wage net of taxes. Notice, that the presence
of ￿m
t in equation (5) is due to the fact that households internalize the e¤ects
of the marginal tax rate when they choose their supply of labor hours. Equa-
tion (6) is the standard Euler equation. Substituting (3) in the households




















It is useful to rewrite equations (7) and (6) as log-deviations from their steady
state values. In particular, from equation (7) we get:
￿^ ct + ￿^ nt = (1 ￿ ￿n) ^ !t ￿ ￿n^ nt; (8)
where ^ !t is the log-deviation of the real wage. When ￿n = 0 (the labor income
tax is ‡at) then we get the standard labor supply equation. Equation (8)
gives us some important insights on the working of our model. Holding con-
sumption constant, progressive taxation of labor income (￿n > 0) dampens
the response of hours worked to change in real wages. Similarly, holding real
wage constant, progressive taxation dampens the response of hours worked
6As suggested to us by an anonymous referee, the same tax scheme could be generated
by a constant proportional tax rate and an allowable deduction. One could therefore
talk, more in general, about the sensitivity of the tax rate to income ‡uctuations, with
progressive taxation being a special case of this.
7to change in consumption. With an upward sloping tax schedule, therefore,
households’ incentives to work decrease.
From the log-linearization of the Euler equation (6) we …nally get:
^ ct = Et f^ ct+1g ￿
1
￿
(^ rt ￿ Et f^ ￿t+1g) (9)
where ^ rt = rt ￿ ￿ log￿ is the log-deviation of the nominal interest rate from
its steady state value.





Since in the steady state ￿ = 1￿￿ and the log-linearization of Yn;t = WtNt=Pt




(^ !t + ^ nt): (11)
2.2 The Role of the Government
The Government always runs a balanced budget. Therefore, in each period







We assume that public consumption evolves exogenously, so that:
^ gt = ￿g^ gt￿1 + "g;t (13)
where ^ gt = ln(Gt=G) is an exogenous AR(1) process. Exogenous Government
spending shocks are useful to study the e¤ects of a temporary changes of the
Government size in the economy. A positive Government spending shock
temporary increases the Government size. As we will see if the Government
spending shocks is followed by a boom in the economy, then output and
real wages increase, consequently Government revenues due to progressive
taxation must increase, thus acting as automatic stabilizers.7
7Notice that the presence of the lump-sum transfer is needed to balance the Government
budget in every period. This assumption does not alter the result on the optimal monetary
policy in response to a technology shocks and gives us the advantage to study the e¤ect
of an exogenous government spending shock.
82.3 Firms
2.3.1 The Final Goods-Producing Sector
A perfectly competitive …nal-good-producing …rm employes Yt (u) units of
each intermediate good u 2 [0;1] at the nominal price Pt(u) to produce Yt











where Yt (u) is the quantity of intermediate good u used as input.
The …nal good is allocated to consumers and to the Government. Pro…t

















The aggregate resource constraint of the economy is:
Yt = Ct + Gt: (17)
Log-linearizing we get:
^ yt = ￿c^ ct + (1 ￿ ￿c) ^ gt (18)
where ￿c = C
Y :
2.3.2 Intermediate Goods Producing Firms
Intermediate goods producing …rms produce a di¤erentiated good with a
linear technology represented by the following constant return to scale pro-
duction function:
Yt (u) = AtNt (u) (19)
where u 2 (0;1) is a …rm speci…c index. At is a technology shock and
at = ln(At=a) follows an AR(1) process, i.e.,
at = ￿aat￿1 + "
a
t (20)
where ￿a < 1 and "a
t is a normally distributed serially uncorrelated innovation
with zero mean and standard deviation ￿a.
9Given the constant return to scale technology and the aggregate nature of
shocks, real marginal costs are the same across the intermediate good produc-
ing …rms. Solving the cost-minimization problem of the representative …rm





It is useful to rewrite equation (21) in log-deviations:
c mct = ^ !t ￿ at (22)
The aggregate production in log-deviations is instead:
^ yt = at + ^ nt (23)
2.3.3 Staggered Price Setting
Firms choose Pt (u) in a staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983). Solving the
Calvo problem and log-linearizing, we …nd a typical forward-looking Phillips
curve:
^ ￿t = ￿Et^ ￿t+1 + ￿d mct (24)
where ￿ =
(1￿')(1￿￿')
' and ' is the probability that prices are reset.
2.3.4 Real Marginal Costs and the ‡exible price equilibrium out-
put
We now want to …nd an expression for the aggregate real marginal costs and,
after imposing that prices are ‡exible, derive the ‡exible price equilibrium
output. Given the ‡exible price equilibrium output (or natural output) we
will then derive the output gap, which is de…ned as the di¤erence between
the actual and the ‡exible price equilibrium output. Let us …rst consider
equilibrium in the labor market which is obtained equating the aggregate
demand for labor (21) and the aggregate labor supply (8). This allows us to








^ ct ￿ at: (25)
Using equations (18), (8) and (23) we can rewrite equation (25) as:
c mct =
￿c (￿ + ￿n) + ￿





￿ (1 ￿ ￿c)
￿c (1 ￿ ￿n)
^ gt: (26)
10We know that under the ‡exible price equilibrium the log of real marginal






c mct = 0. Therefore, imposing this last condition (which holds only when
prices are ‡exible) and solving for ^ yt; we …nd the ‡exible price equilibrium




￿c (1 + ￿)
(￿ + ￿n)￿c + ￿
at +
￿ (1 ￿ ￿c)
(￿ + ￿n)￿c + ￿
^ gt (27)
As we said before, when ￿n = 0, the average and marginal tax rates of labor
income are both equal to 1￿￿; and therefore the labor income tax becomes







￿ (1 ￿ ￿c)
￿ + ￿￿c
^ gt (28)
Note that the di¤erence between (27) and (28) is:
^ y
f





((￿ + ￿n)￿c + ￿)(￿ + ￿￿c)
at￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿c)￿n￿c
((￿ + ￿n)￿c + ￿)(￿ + ￿￿c)
^ gt
(29)
In an economy characterized by progressive taxation of labor income, the
‡exible price equilibrium output is always lower than the one that would
arise in an economy where the labor income tax is ‡at.
2.4 The Phillips Curve
Notice that from (26) and (27) we are able to rewrite real marginal costs in
terms of output gap, which is de…ned as the di¤erence between the actual




￿ + ￿c (￿ + ￿n)
￿c (1 ￿ ￿n)
￿





Using (30) the NKPC can be written as
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿&x
￿







￿c(1￿￿n) : We following Benigno and Woodford (2005) to rewrite
the NKPC in terms of the welfare relevant output as,
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿^ xt + ￿ut (32)
11where ￿ = ￿&x; ut = (^ y￿
t ￿ ^ yn
t ) and ^ xt = (^ yt ￿ ^ y￿
t) is the welfare relevant
output gap.
In Appendix (A1) we show that ut is completely exogenous and, indeed, it
is a function of technology and government spending shocks. Therefore, un-
like what happens in the standard NK model, the di¤erence between welfare
relevant output8 and ‡exible price equilibrium output is not constant, but is
a function of the relevant shocks that hit the economy. What Blanchard and
Galì (2007) de…ne as the "divine coincidence"9 does not hold since a policy
that brings the economy to its natural level is not necessarily optimal.
We are therefore able to state the following:
Proposition 1 Endogenous trade-o¤. With progressive taxation on labor
income an endogenous trade-o¤ between stabilizing in‡ation and the
output gap emerges. The New Keynesian Phillips Curve is a¤ected by
technology and government spending shocks.
The endogenous trade-o¤ between in‡ation stabilization and output sta-
bilization is a consequence of the progressivity of the tax rate. Suppose a
positive productivity shock hits the economy. E¢cient output and natural
output both increase, but natural output increases less. This implies that
the welfare relevant output increases more than natural output. The reason
is the following. Because of the productivity shock the demand for labor
increases and the real wage increases in order to restore equilibrium in the
labor market. If taxes were ‡at, e¢cient and ‡exible price equilibrium out-
put would be identical but for a constant, which disappears when we write
the two outputs in log-deviation from the steady state. When taxes are
progressive, instead, as the real wage increases, labor income tax increases
more than proportionally. The supply of labor therefore increases less than
in the e¢cient economy and the increase in the natural output is smaller.
Since natural output increases less than the welfare relevant output following
a productivity shock, to reduce the welfare relevant output gap the central
bank must accept a higher rate of in‡ation.
It is important to notice that, in this model, the endogenous trade-o¤
between in‡ation stabilization and output stabilization arises without any
assumption on real wage rigidity as in Blanchard-Galì (2007), or on the
8As shown by Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Gnocchi (2009) among others, when
the model economy is log-linearized around a distorted steady state, the welfare relevant
output is a function of the e¢cient and of the natural output.
9Blanchard and Galì (2007) de…ne the divine coincidence as the absence, in the standard
NK model, of an endogenous trade-o¤ between stabilizing in‡ation and unemployment.
12structure of labor contracts as in Mattesini and Rossi (2009). Rather, it is
a simple consequence of the structure of taxation that, in most countries,
shows some degree of progressivity. Notice also that the e¤ect of progressive
taxation is the opposite of the e¤ect of real wage rigidity. When real wages
are rigid, following a productivity shock, natural output tends to increase
more than the welfare relevant output, while in the case of progressive tax-
ation natural output tends to increase less than the welfare relevant output.
Progressive labor income taxation, therefore, acts as an automatic stabilizer.
The stabilizing e¤ect of ￿n will be shown in detail in the next section, where
we study the dynamics of our model.





￿c (￿n ￿ 1)
2 (￿ + ￿c + ￿￿c) > 0: (33)
Hence:
Corollary 1. the higher the degree of progressivity of the labor income tax,
￿n; the steeper becomes the NKPC.
Notice that for ￿n = 0; the Phillips curve collapses to the standard NK
forward looking Phillips curve. By closing the gap ^ xt, the Central Bank is
able to obtain an in‡ation rate equal to zero.
Here is some intuition for Corollary 1. Ceteris paribus, in order to produce
more output, …rms need more labor and the real wage must increase. If taxes
on labor income are progressive, the increase in the real wage is followed by
an increase in the marginal tax rate ￿m
t and the supply of labor increases less
than in the basic NK model. Therefore, with respect to the standard NK
model, to produce the same amount of output, …rms must pay higher real
wages at the cost of setting higher prices and therefore higher in‡ation. The
NKPC, therefore, becomes steeper as ￿n increases.
All the results we obtain in this section derive from the fact that pro-
gressive taxation makes hours worked, and hence output, less sensitive to
fundamentals (i.e. productivity and government spending shocks). This
holds both in the ‡exible-price equilibrium and in a sticky-price equilibrium.
With ‡exible prices this is quite clear from equation (27) where we see that a
higher ￿n implies a smaller impact of productivity and government spending
shocks to output. With sticky prices, as shown by equation (30) and the
13de…nition of &x it materializes through a higher sensitivity of marginal costs
to economic fundamentals. The discrepancy between ‡exible-price output
and the e¢cient one enters into the sticky-price equilibrium as a cost push
shock in the determination of the in‡ation rate, as shown by equation (31).
Hence, there is a trade-o¤: in‡ation stabilization and output stabilization to
its e¢cient level cannot be simultaneously attained.
2.5 The IS curve
The reduced form solution of the model is given by the IS curve and the
NKPC. In order to …nd the IS curve, we combine together the Euler equation
(9), the aggregate resource constraint (18), the aggregate production function
(23) and the aggregate labor supply (8). After some algebra we get:
^ yt = Et^ yt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿c)Et￿^ gt+1 ￿
￿c
￿
(b rt ￿ Et f^ ￿t+1g) (34)
we can rewrite the IS curve in terms of the welfare relevant output gap as
follows:











t is the interest rate that characterizes an e¢cient-frictionless econ-
omy.
3 Dynamics
In this section we study how the progressivity of the labor income tax a¤ects
the dynamics of the model. In particular, we look at how ￿n a¤ects: (i)
the conditions under which the rational expectation equilibrium is determi-
nate, (ii) the responses of output and in‡ation to a technology, a government
spending shock and a monetary shock.
We close the model by specifying an equation for the monetary authority.
We assume that the Central Bank sets the short run nominal interest rate
according to the following standard Taylor-type rule:
b rt = ￿￿b ￿t + ￿y^ xt + ist: (36)
where ist is an exogenous monetary shock, modelled as an AR(1) process,
i.e.,
ist = ￿iist￿1 + "
i
t (37)
where ￿i < 1 and "i
t is a normally distributed serially uncorrelated innovation
with zero mean and standard deviation ￿i.
143.1 Determinacy and the Taylor principle
To assess the determinacy of the Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE),
we consider equation (32), we then substitute the Taylor rule (36) into the
IS curve (35), together with the de…nition of the e¢cient interest rate. We
then write the two structural equations in the following matrix format
Xt = BEtXt+1 + Aut, (38)
where vector Xt includes the in‡ation rate ￿t and the output gap xt. ut is
a vector of all the shocks, i.e. at; gt; ist. Determinacy of REE is obtained
if the standard Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions are satis…ed. Our
model is isomorphic to the standard NK model, and matrix B is exactly
the same which characterizes the determinacy properties of the standard
model. The only di¤erence is due to the parameter ￿n indicating the degree
of progressivity of the labor income tax which a¤ects the slope of the NKPC.
Therefore, following Woodford (2001, 2003, see chp. 4.2.2) the necessary and




￿y > 1 (39)
where in our model ￿ =
￿￿+￿c(￿+￿n)
￿c(1￿￿n) . We can therefore look at the e¤ects of
progressive taxation on the determinacy region. We can state the following:
Proposition 2. The e¤ects of progressive taxation on the determi-







= ￿￿c (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ + ￿c + ￿￿c
￿(￿ + ￿n￿c + ￿￿c)
2 < 0 (40)
which implies that the determinacy region shrinks in the parameter space
(￿￿;￿y) as the degree of the progressive taxation increases
According to Proposition 2 progressive taxation on labor income shrinks
the determinacy region. This means that for a given ￿y condition (39) is
satis…ed for higher of ￿￿:
In order to get some intuition about this result, suppose that, in the
absence of any shock to fundamentals, there was an increase in the expected
in‡ation. In the basic NK model a central bank that operates according to
a Taylor rule must react by increasing the nominal interest rate more than
15proportionally than the rate of in‡ation. The real interest rate increases so
that consumption and output decrease. If the reaction of the central bank is
strong enough, it will be able to avoid self-ful…lling in‡ationary expectations.
It is important to notice that when output decreases, real wages decrease as
well.
In an economy with progressive taxation, taxes act as automatic sta-
bilizers: when the central bank raises the real interest rate the net wage
received by households increases and consequently the supply of labor hours
decreases less than in the basic NK model. Output therefore decreases less,
and the monetary authority to avoid self-ful…lling in‡ation has to use a more
aggressive policy rule.
3.2 Impulse Response Functions
We now analyze how the dynamics of the log-linearized model depends on
the parameter ￿n which characterizes the degree of progressivity of labor
income taxation. In particular, we look at the implied dynamics of the main
economic variables in response to a positive productivity shock, to a positive
government spending shock and to a positive monetary shock.
We calibrate the model using the following parameters speci…cation:10 as
in Blanchard and Galì (2007) we set ￿ = 1; ￿ = 1; and ￿ = 0:99; following
Basu and Fernald (1997), the value added mark-up of prices over marginal
cost is set equal to 0.2. This generates a value for the price elasticity of
demand, " = 6: Finally, …rms probability to revise prices, '; is set equal to
0:75:11 From the steady state we …nd that ￿c =
1+￿("￿1)
" : We set ￿ = 0:7
which, as in Guo and Lansing (1999) implies that in steady state the average
income tax rate is equal to 0:3. The persistence of technology, Government
spending and monetary policy shocks are respectively: ￿a = ￿g = ￿i = 0:9:
The three shocks are calibrated to have 1% standard deviation. We consider
the case in which the monetary authority implements the standard Taylor
(1993) rule, and therefore we set ￿￿ = 1:5 and ￿y = 0:5=4: None of the
qualitative results depends on the calibration values chosen.
Figures 1-3 show the responses of in‡ation, output, labor hours and real
wages to a positive technology shock, to a positive Government spending
shock and to a positive monetary shock for di¤erent values of ￿n.
- Figures 1-3 about here -
10None of the qualitative results are a¤ected by the parameters’ choice.
11See for example Galì (2008) among others.
16Figure 1 shows that, in response to a positive technology shock, output
and real wages increase on impact while in‡ation and labor hours decrease.
They all return to their initial level after almost thirty periods. The negative
response of labor hours to a technology shock is consistent with much of
the recent empirical evidence on the e¤ects of technology shocks (see, for
example, Galì and Rabanal, 2004 and, more recently, Canova et al. 2010).
This is due to the presence of price stickiness. Indeed, even though all …rms
experience a decline in their marginal cost, only a fraction of them are able to
adjust their prices downwards in the short run. Accordingly, the aggregate
price level declines, and aggregate demand rises, less than proportionally
with the increase in productivity. Consequently, a decline in aggregate hours
worked occurs.
It is quite evident, from the impulse response functions, that in response
to a technology shock progressive taxation acts as an automatic stabilizer
for output and in‡ation. The higher is ￿n; the lower is the e¤ect of the
technology shock on output, and in‡ation. Conversely, the higher is ￿n, the
higher the e¤ect on labor hours.12
The e¤ects of government spending shocks are shown in Figure 2. As in
the standard NK model the e¤ect on output, hours and real wages is positive.
This results however depends on a series of forces working on di¤erent di-
rections. A government spending shock directly increases aggregate demand
but has also a negative wealth e¤ect on consumption induced by the need
to pay higher taxes to …nance spending. Since consumption and leisure in
this model are normal goods, the negative wealth e¤ect generates also an
increase in labor supply. Because of sticky prices this implies higher output
and higher in‡ation. Progressive taxation dampens the positive impact of
the shock on output and labor hours. This happens because with progressive
taxation higher real wages means higher taxes and this has negative retroac-
tive e¤ect on labor supply. Notice however that the higher is ￿n the higher is
the increase in in‡ation. The reason is that, relatively to the case of ￿n = 0,
…rms must pay higher real wages to produce the same amount of output.
This implies higher prices and therefore higher in‡ation.
The e¤ects of a positive monetary shock are shown in Figure 3.13 A
12The reason is that the technology shock enters the NKPC and that the NKPC becomes
steeper as ￿n increases. This implies that with a progressive labor income taxation actual
output increases less than in the standard NK model. That, in turn, induces a stronger
decline in aggregate employment.
13Some caution is required when we interpret the impulse response functions of the
monetary policy shocks. The large e¤ects that we …nd are largely a consequence of the
fact that, for simplicity, being our exercise purely qualitative, all shocks are calibrated
in the same way. This type of calibration for a monetary shock is not very realistic.
17positive monetary shock, which increases the nominal interest rate, implies a
decrease in consumption and aggregate demand, which is then followed by a
decrease of in‡ation, output, hours and real wages. Notice that, progressive
taxation dampens the impact of shocks on output, hours and employment.
The higher is ￿n the higher is the decrease in in‡ation.
Overall, we can claim that progressive taxation seems to have a stabilizing
e¤ect on the economic activity.
4 Quantitative Evaluation
An interesting implication of our model is that progressive taxation acts
as an automatic stabilizer, reducing the volatility of relevant variables like
output, labor hours and in‡ation in response to macroeconomic shocks. In
order to check whether our model is consistent with the data, in this section
we provide a quantitative assessment of the relationship between progressive
taxation and macroeconomic volatility. To this purpose we regress, for a
sample of 24 OECD countries, various measures of volatility on an indicator
of tax progressivity and other control variables.
The …rst issue that arises in our empirical exercise is to provide a reliable
measure of the degree of progressivity of the tax system which in our model
is given by the parameter ￿n: We start by considering the marginal tax rate
given by equation (4)14. At the steady state
￿m = ￿ + ￿￿n (41)
Dividing by the average tax rate ￿ and considering that, at the steady state,









Notice that the parameter ￿n is the product of two components: the ratio
1￿￿
￿ where ￿ is the average tax rate in the long run, and the ratio ￿m
￿ which
According to recent estimates for the US economy by Smets and Wouters (2007), the
quarterly standard deviation of the monetary shocks ranges from 0.2% for the period
1966:1–1979:2 to 0.12% for the period 1984:1–2004:4, while Benati and Surico (2009), who
impose equilibrium indeterminacy for the pre–October 1979 period and determinacy for
the post-Volcker stabilization periods, …nd a variance of the monetary disturbance equal
to 0.492%.
Once we use these types of values for the calibration, the monetary policy shock is not
very important, although progressive taxation still has a stabilizing e¤ect for the economy.
14As we mentioned above, following Guo and Lansing (1998) (1999), we de…ne the
margial tax rate as
@(￿tYn;t)
@Yn;t :
18is the elasticity of the tax rate to the relevant tax base (which in our case
is the ratio between steady state labor income Yn and actual labor income
Yn;t). We evaluate the …rst component by taking, for a sample of 24 OECD
countries, the mean of the average tax rates over the period 1999-2009.
Data on the second component, which require a careful analysis of each
country tax legislation, are not usually available, but the Economics Depart-
ment of the OECD, in order to provide estimates of cyclically adjusted budget
balances, has occasionally produced estimates of tax elasticities. The last of-
…cial estimate dates back to 199915, but fortunately tax elasticities have been
more recently re-estimated and re-speci…ed by Andrè and Girouard (2005).
In table 2, we report the elasticities of the income tax to earnings provided
by Girouard and Andrè (2005)16 together with the mean of the average tax
rates over the period 1999:1-2009:4. These two sets of data are used to
compute the parameter ￿n; which is also reported in table 2. In the same
table we also report the standard deviation of detrended GDP, the standard
deviation of labor hours and the standard deviation of in‡ation for our sample
period17.
- Figures 4 - 6 about here -
In Figures 4 - 6 the standard deviations of output, in‡ation and labor
hours are plotted against the parameter ￿n for our group of countries. In
Table 3 below, we report our OLS cross section estimates. Output volatility
￿y; hours volatility ￿h and in‡ation volatility ￿￿ are regressed on a constant
C, on our measure of tax progressivity ￿n; and on a set of controls that have
been found in the literature to be important determinants of macroeconomic
volatility. In particular, we use, as additional regressors, the standard devi-
ation of Government consumption, ￿G; the standard deviation of the terms
15See OECD Economic Outlook, No. 66. Detailed results OECD’s cyclically adjusted
budget balances are reported by Van den Noord (2000).
16We consider all the countries for which data have been provided by Girouard and
Andrè (2005), except for Luxemburg and Iceland, two countries that, being much smaller
than all the others, clearly show a very anomalous behavior. Girouard and Andrè (2005)
provide various measures of elasticities depending on the relevant tax base. We use the
earnings elasticity because it is the most appropriate to our model which studies the
progressivity of labor income taxes.
17Precisely, as a measure of output gap volatility we use the standard deviation of the
ln(realGDP). As a measure of the volatility of in‡ation we use the standard deviation
of ￿lnCPI: Both variables are detrended using the Hodrick and Prescott …lter with a
smoothing parameter ￿ = 1600. The standard deviation of labor hours is measured by
taking the log of the average annual hours worked (quarterly data are not available) …ltered
using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter with ￿ = 100:
19of trade ￿tot and two measures of labor market institutions.18 As an indi-
cator of …ring costs we use the strictness of employment protection, EPL;
computed by the OECD and as an indicator of the degree of centraliza-
tion in labor contracts, the union density UD; also computed by the OECD.
Both variables are averaged over the sample period. As recently shown by
Abbritti and Weber (2010), Campolmi and Faia (2011), Merkl and Schmitz
(2011) and Rumler and Scharler (2009) labor market institutions seem to
play an important role in determining macroeconomic volatility, especially
in the Euro Area countries.
To control for size e¤ects we use the log of real GDP, Y; averaged over
the sample period. We also include a dummy variable DUE which takes
the value of 1 if a country belongs to the European Union and the value of
0 otherwise. This dummy variable is meant to capture all the unexplained
factors, besides those explicitly included among the regressors that are likely
to in‡uence volatility in an area, such as the European Union, that is quite
homogenous from the institutional point of view.
18The standard deviation of terms of trade and that of government expenditure are
computed similarly to the standard deviation of real GDP. As a measure of government
expenditure we use quarterly data on government consumption. Quarterly terms of trade
are de…ned as the ratio between the de‡ator for exports and the de‡ator for imports
of goods and services. Both variables are …ltered using the Hodrik-Prescott …lter with
￿ = 1600: The regression having labor hours as dependent variable uses the same variables
with annual frequency, …ltered using the Hodrik-Prescott …lter with ￿ = 100: All the data
come from the OECD database.
20Dependent variables
Regressors ￿y ￿H ￿￿













































































R2 0:65 0:61 0:52 0:30 0:72 0:66
Signi…cance:
￿￿￿1%; ￿￿5%; ￿10%: t-statistics in parenthesis
Table 3.
For every dependent variable we …rst report the regression where all the
explanatory variables are included, and then the regression where only the
variables with a signi…cance level below 10% are left. In the …rst two columns
of table 3 we report the regressions of the standard deviation of output. No-
tice that, our indicator of tax progressivity is signi…cant and enters with a
negative sign. The other two signi…cant variables are the volatility of gov-
ernment expenditure, ￿g; and the strictness of employment protection, EPL.
The former enters with a positive sign, while the latter enters with a nega-
tive sign. This is in line with the literature quoted above that emphasizes
the negative relationship between EPL and output volatility. The union
density indicator, UD, the standard deviation of the terms of trade, ￿tot
and the average real GDP, Y instead, are not signi…cant. Also the dummy
variable DUE enters signi…cantly our output volatility regression indicat-
ing that, ceteris paribus, European countries, for the period 1999-2009 have
shown higher volatility than the other OECD countries.19
19The inclusion of the dummy DUE is crucial in determining the signi…cance also of ￿n
and EPL:
21In the second set of regressions the dependent variable is the volatility
of labor hours. Again our indicator of tax progressivity shows a signi…cant
negative relationship with hours volatility. The dummy variable DUE how-
ever is not signi…cant. In the …nal regression the only signi…cant explanatory
variables besides ￿n is the union density indicator, UD, which enters with
a negative sign, meaning that a more centralized labor market reduces the
volatility of labor hours.
Finally, the last two columns of table 3, report the in‡ation volatility
regressions. Also the standard deviation of in‡ation is negatively related to
tax progressivity, as we show in the theoretical model. Again, the Euro-
pean dummy DUE is not signi…cant and the only other signi…cant explana-
tory variable, in accordance with the results obtained by Merkl and Schmitz
(2011), is the standard deviation of government expenditure.
Overall, the estimates presented above are consistent with the results of
our model. Although some caution is necessary in interpreting these results
since they are based on a limited amount of available data, they provide,
nevertheless, a clear indication that progressive taxation works as an au-
tomatic stabilizer, and therefore should not be ignored in macroeconomic
policy evaluation.
5 Optimal Monetary Policy
In order to analyze the consequences of progressive taxation for optimal mon-
etary policy, we now derive the loss function of the Central Bank. To this
purpose, we follow Benigno and Woodford (2005) and we derive a second or-
der approximation of the household utility function under a distorted steady























^ ￿t = ￿Et^ ￿t+1 + ￿^ xt + ￿ut
where qx and q￿ are complicated convolution parameters depending on the
structural parameters of the model. This speci…c structure of these para-
meters, together with the derivation of the loss function, are reported in
20As shown by Benigno and Woodoford (2005) in the face of large distortions the pres-
ence of a linear term in (43) would require the use of a second-order approximation to the
equilibrium condition connecting output gap and in‡ation. The technical Appendix (A.1)
shows in detail how we derive the loss-function reported below.
22Appendix A.1.21 Notice that the linear term ^ xt captures the fact that any
increase in output positively a¤ects welfare. Notice also that, by following
the methodology developed by Benigno and Woodford (2005), the Central
Bank’s problem has the convenient linear-quadratic form even with a dis-
torted steady state.
5.1 Discretion
If the Central Bank cannot credibly commit in advance to a future policy
action or to a sequence of future policy actions, then the optimal monetary
policy is discretionary, in the sense that the policy makers choose in each
period the value to assign to the policy instrument it: The Central Bank
minimizes the welfare-based loss function, subject to the Phillips curve, tak-















￿t = ￿xt + ft
where ft = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿ut; ￿x =
qx









Solving the problem we …nd that optimality requires the following tar-
geting rule:




Proposition 3. A unit increase in in‡ation requires a decrease in the output
gap which is not independent from the degree of progressivity of the labor
income tax.
To show our result in a more readable and tractable way, we now consider
the e¤ect of a technology shock. In order to do so we assume that public




(1 + ￿ + ￿￿n)"
((1 + ￿)((1 ￿ ￿n) + ￿n￿) + ￿n￿)
(45)
21As shown by Benigno and Woodford (2005), the term Tt0 is a transitory component,
de…ned in the appendix, which is predetermined at the time of the policy choice.




" < 1 is the steady state distortion. Taking the derivative
of ￿







= "(1 ￿ ￿)
(￿ + 1)
2
(￿ ￿ ￿n + 2￿n￿ + ￿n￿(￿ ￿ 1) + 1)
2 > 0
Corollary 2. A unit increase in in‡ation requires a decrease in the output
gap. Such decrease is greater the higher is the degree of progressivity of
the tax system.
Substituting (44) in the IS curve we …nally …nd the optimal interest rate,
which is given by:
b r
￿










Proposition 4. With progressive taxation the Central Bank implements the
Taylor principle, i.e., the monetary authority increases the nominal
interest rate more than proportionally with respect to the increase in
the in‡ation rate. Since in‡ation falls down in response to a positive
technology shock, this means that the monetary authority responds pro-
cyclically to a positive technology shock.23









Corollary 3. The higher the degree of the progressivity of the labor income
tax the more aggressive is optimal policy in response to a technology
shock.
23Symmetrically, when the shock is a government spending shock or a cost-push shock,
which rise in‡ation on impact, the monetary authority responds by increasing the nominal
interest rate.
24The interest rate rule given by (46) is isomorphic to the rule derived
by Clarida et al (1999). Bullard and Mitra (2002) show that this type of
rule is more prone to indeterminacy than a rule targeting contemporaneous
in‡ation. As in Bullard and Mitra (2002), in order to guarantee determinacy,













and therefore there is also an upper bound on ￿￿.24
In the standard model, the upper bound is not considered a problem since it
is quite big for the standard parameters. Notice however that in this model,
￿￿ is an increasing function of ￿n; while the upper bound which guarantees
determinacy, 1 +
2(1+￿)
￿ is a decreasing function of ￿n: This means that it
is possible that the upper bound for determinacy is lower than the optimal
response to in‡ation and the rule is not implementable.25
It is possible however to solve this problem by using the alternative speci-
…cation proposed by Evans and Honkapohja (2003). Using (44), the IS curve
and the NKPC we can apply this alternative speci…cation also to our model













As we show in Appendix A3, also in our economy with progressive taxation
this rule insures determinacy of the REE.
In order to evaluate the welfare implications of monetary policy, we now
compute the unconditional welfare-loss. Combining the NKPC with equation
(44) and iterating forward we get:
￿t = ￿x&a￿at (49)
where ￿ = 1
￿2+￿x(1￿￿￿a) and &a = ￿
(1+￿)(1￿￿)
(1￿￿n)qx : Combining then (49) with (44)
we obtain:
^ xt = ￿￿&a￿at: (50)
24Remember that for simplicity we set ￿ = 1: Results are not a¤ected qualitatively by
this choice.
25It is not possible to …nd a clear analytical condition on ￿n and therefore we resort to
numerical simulations. We …nd that for the standard parameterization used in this paper,
the coe¢cient of optimal rule, i.e. ￿￿ is always below its lower bound, for empirical realistic
values of ￿n. However, ￿￿ becomes lower than the upper bound when considering lower
values of ￿a. For example, with ￿a = 0:5 the optimal coe¢cient ￿￿ becomes greater than
the upper bound and the REE is indeterminate for su¢cient high value of ￿n (￿n > 0:53 is
su¢cient): We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this point and for suggesting
the alternative rule proposed by Evans and Honkapoja (2003).
25If we now substitute (49) and (50) in the loss-function we obtain the uncon-














5.2 Gains from Commitment
We now assess the welfare gains that the Central Bank may obtain by com-
mitting to a state-contingent rule of the kind studied by Clarida et al. (1999):
^ x
c
t = ￿!at (52)



















this means that under constrained commitment to the rule (52) a 1% con-
traction in the output gap ^ xc
t reduces in‡ation ￿c
t by the factor ￿
1￿￿￿a: Under
discretion the same reduction in the output gap produces a fall in ￿t only
equal to ￿ < ￿
1￿￿￿a: Under constrained commitment, therefore, the gains from
reducing in‡ation are higher than the ones under discretion.26 As in Clar-
ida et al (1999), the problem of the Central Bank is to choose the optimal
value of the feedback parameter ! by minimizing the welfare-loss subject to











x = ￿x (1 ￿ ￿￿a) < ￿x: The equilibrium solution for ^ xc
t and ￿c
t are











26It is worth to notice, that the unconstrained Pareto optimum would dominate the rules
analyzed under constrained commitment. As shown by Evans and Honkapohja (2006) the
rule obtained under unconstrained commitment is always determinate.
26where ￿c = 1
￿2+￿c
x(1￿￿￿a) : Finally, to evaluate welfare we can compute the

















As a measure of the welfare gains implied by commitment we take the ratio
between the unconditional loss under discretion LD and the unconditional
loss under commitment LC: This measures the welfare loss from moving from






x (1 ￿ ￿￿a))
2 ￿
￿2
x + ￿x (￿&a￿)
2￿
(￿2 + ￿x (1 ￿ ￿￿a))
2 ￿
￿c2
x + ￿x (￿&a￿c)
2￿ (59)
Notice that with ￿a = 0 the welfare gains are nil. In this case the central bank
is not able to improve the performance of monetary policy by conditioning
future expectation, since the e¤ect of the shock last for just one period. The
more persistent the shocks, therefore, the higher are the welfare gains from
commitment.
Figure 7 shows what happens to the welfare gains when the parameter
￿n increases.
- Figure 7 about here -
As we can see from this graph, the more progressive are labor income
taxes, the lower are the welfare gains from commitment. The intuition is
straightforward. Remember that by committing to a state contingent rule as
in (52) the monetary authority yields a more stable in‡ation. As we show
in section 3, however, a progressive labor income tax has a stabilizing e¤ect.
Therefore, in economies characterized by a high ￿n, the need for stabilizing
in‡ation is not very high, and the gains from commitment deriving from
stabilizing in‡ation become lower as ￿n increases.
6 Conclusions
We introduce progressive taxation on labor income in a New Keynesian model
and we study the dynamics of the model and the optimal monetary policy
both under discretion and under commitment to a state-contingent rule. We
…nd that progressive taxation on labor income introduces a trade-o¤ between
27output and in‡ation stabilization. As a consequence, the NKPC is a¤ected
by technology and demand shocks. Interestingly, the NKPC becomes steeper
the higher is the degree of the progressivity of the labor income tax.
Another important result is the stabilizing role played by progressive tax-
ation. The more progressive is the tax system, the smaller is the response
of the economy to technology, government spending, and monetary policy
shocks. This in turn implies a negative relationship between output, labor
hours and in‡ation volatility and the degree of progressivity of labor income
taxation. The results of the model are in line with available evidence.
We …nally show that progressive labor income taxation a¤ects the pre-
scriptions for the optimal discretionary monetary policy and we …nd that the
welfare gains from commitment decrease the more progressive is the labor
income tax.
Progressive taxation is a common feature, especially in the industrial-
ized world. Given the many consequences that this important institutional
feature of modern economies, our model suggests that Dynamic New Key-
nesian models should not ignore the tax structure if they want to provide a
satisfactory interpretation of the dynamics of contemporary economies and
the e¤ects of monetary policy. More in general, it suggests that the working
of automatic stabilizers, a long neglected issued in modern macroeconomics,
should receive renewed attention.
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A Technical Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the Central Bank Welfare Function
around a Distorted Steady State
We know that (see for example Galì 2008 chp. 4) if the steady state is e¢cient
labor market equilibrium implies
C
￿N
￿ = A =
Y
N
We now check whether the steady state of our model is e¢cient or not.


































In order to derive the second order approximation of the Central Bank welfare














￿ (" ￿ 1)
"
= 1 +
￿ (" ￿ 1)
"
￿ 1 = 1 ￿
" ￿ ￿ (" ￿ 1)
"
= 1 ￿ ￿ (64)
where ￿ < 1 is the steady state distortion, i.e., the steady-state wedge be-
tween the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and
the marginal product of labor, and hence the ine¢ciency of the steady-state
output level. Remember in Benigno and Woodford (2005) the steady state
distortion is




in our model ￿ correspond to (1 ￿ ￿) of Benigno and Woodford (2005).
This means that:
V (N)N = UC (C)Y (1 ￿ ￿)
Given that the utility function is separable in consumption and leisure we
approximate the two parts of the utility function separately. Consider …rst
the utility of consumption U (Ct) = U (Yt ￿ Gt) which can be approximated
up to a second order as:
U (Yt ￿ Gt) ￿ U (Y ￿ G) + UC
dC
dY (Yt ￿ Y ) + 1
2UCC
dC




dY dGGY (Yt ￿ Y )(Gt ￿ G) + UC
dC
dG (Gt ￿ G) + 1
2UCC
dC
dG (Gt ￿ G)
2 + O(￿3)
where dC
dY = 1 = ￿dC
dG: Up to a second order Yt ￿ Y = Y ^ yt + 1
2Y ^ y2
t
and (Yt ￿ Y )
2 = Y 2^ y2




2 = G2^ g2
t +O(￿3): Then, considering that
UCCC
UC = ￿￿; the previous
equation becomes:









































Collecting terms and recalling that U (Yt ￿ Gt) ￿ U (Y ￿ G) = ~ U (Yt ￿ Gt):
~ U (Yt ￿ Gt) ￿ UCY
 






￿c ^ gt^ yt













33Now consider the second order approximation of the utility of leisure V (Nt);
after collecting terms and given that
VNNN
VN = ￿ and that V (Nt) ￿ VNN =
~ V (Nt) we get:

















subtracting (67) from (66) we get:
~ Wt = UCY
 






￿c ^ gt^ yt


























We know that in the steady state V (N)N = UC (C)Y (1 ￿ ￿); therefore
we can rewrite (68) as follows:
~ Wt = UCY
 






￿c ^ gt^ yt























From the production function we know that ^ nt = ^ yt ￿ at + dt and ^ n2
t =
(^ yt ￿ at)
2 and collecting terms:
~ Wt = UCY
"




￿c ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)
￿
^ y2
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)dt
+
￿(1￿￿c)

















￿1vari fpi;tg: Using these























Notice that (71) when ￿ > 0 there is a non-zero linear term in (71) which
means that we cannot evaluate this equation to second order using a log-
linear approximation for the path of aggregate output. Thus we cannot
study optimal policy using the log-linear approximation of the competitive
34equilibrium economy. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) avoid this problem
by introducing subsidies to ensure that ￿ = 0: We relax this assumption and
in solving the optimal problem we follow Benigno and Woodford (2005) who
show that the …rst order term in equation (71) can be eliminated by taking
a second-order approximation of the aggregate supply relation, that is by























where (72) is the standard …rst order condition we get when solving the











￿y^ yt + ￿2
y^ y2


















' ; ￿y =
￿+￿c(￿+￿n)

















































To simplify the analysis we now consider the case in which ￿ = 1 and
￿c = 1: The coe¢cient of equation (74) becomes
8
> > > <
> > > :
qx =
￿























which are the coe¢cient of the welfare-loss (43) in the main text. From (74)
it is now easy to de…ne the welfare relevant output gap as a weighted average





















t = at and ^ yn
t =
1+￿
1+￿+￿nat; so that ^ y￿










Notice that the weights in (76) depends on the steady state distortion ￿: The
welfare-loss can be now rewritten in terms of output gap from the welfare
relevant output as in the main text (equation (43)).
The NKPC is
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿(^ yt ￿ ^ y
n
t ) (78)
where ￿ = ￿
1+￿+￿n
1￿￿n : Adding and subtracting ^ y￿
t
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿(yt ￿ ^ y
￿
t) + ￿(^ y
￿
t ￿ ^ y
n
t ) (79)
In the main text we call ut = (^ y￿
t ￿ ^ yn
t ):
Notice that given the de…nition of qx; then ^ y￿
t can be written as:
^ y
￿
t = ￿1^ y
Eff











qx = 1 ￿ ￿1 and (79) can be rewritten
as,
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿
1 + ￿ + ￿n
1 ￿ ￿n












￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿
1 + ￿ + ￿n
1 ￿ ￿n
(yt ￿ ^ y
￿
t) + ￿
(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿n
(1 ￿ ￿n)qx
at (82)
We can …nally rewrite the NKPC used to study optimal monetary policy,
both under discretion and commitment, as
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿(yt ￿ ^ y
￿
t) + ￿aat (83)
where ￿a = ￿
(1+￿)(1￿￿)￿n
(1￿￿n)qx :
Finally, notice that for ￿n = 0; then we get the same equation as Benigno
and Woodford (2005) and Gnocchi (2009) among others. Indeed,




qa = (1 + ￿)






















Notice also that in the case in which ￿n = 0, the coe¢cient ￿a = 0 and the
NKPC (83) becomes
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿(yt ￿ ^ y
￿
t) (85)
This means that the monetary authority does not face any trade-o¤ in sta-
bilizing in‡ation and output gap. Therefore, when ￿t = 0; the output gap
becomes also equal to zero and the welfare-loss is nil.
A.2 Proof of Preposition 5
We want to prove that the sign of the derivative of the in‡ation coe¢cient
of the optimal interest rate rule (46), i.e. 1 +
￿￿(1￿￿)
ax￿ with respect to ￿n is
greater than zero.
Notice that after some algebra we can rewrite the coe¢cient as:
1 +
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
ax￿
= 1 +
(1 + ￿ + ￿￿n)"
((1 + ￿)((1 ￿ ￿n) + ￿n￿) + ￿n￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿











= ￿"(￿ ￿ 1)
(￿ + 1)
2
(￿ ￿ ￿n + 2￿n￿ ￿ ￿n￿ + ￿n￿￿ + 1)
2








37A.3 Determinacy under rule (48)




















where t:n:a:d: states for terms not a¤ecting determinacy of the REE. The
optimal rule is always determinate if the roots of the characteristics equation
det(C) = det[A ￿ ￿I] lie inside the unit circle. Notice that
det(C) = det
￿
￿￿x (￿x + ￿2)











which has the following solutions: ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 =
￿￿x
(￿x+￿2) < 1: Thus,
both roots lie inside the unite circle and the optimal rule (48) is always
determinate.
38Table 1. Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate, (year: 2008). Source: OECD
39Table 2. Earning elasticities (André and Girouard 2005), average income
tax, tax progressivity and standard deviations of dependent variables.
































Fig. 1. IRFs to a 1% technology shock

































Figure 2. IRFs to a positive 1% Government Spending shock
































Fig. 3. IRFs to a 1% monetary shock
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Figure 4. Degree of tax progressivity and volatility of real GDP
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Figure 5. Degree of tax progressivity and volatility of labor hours
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Effect on Welfare of Varying ρ
a and φ
















Fig. 7 Welfare Gains from Commitment
44